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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GARY M. EDWARDS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT Case No. 920793-CA 
SECURITY, 
Priority No. 7 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
The facts which gave rise to the case before the Court are 
simple and straightforward; however, the bizarre way they were 
interpreted made the case complex. Neither Petitioner's counsel 
nor the reviewing/judicial parties understood or made an attempt to 
understand the actual circumstances and events. Petitioner was 
unemployed March 20, 1991, having worked for Air System 
Mechanical/Utah Air Sales but left when his employer refused to pay 
him his earned commissions. Although eligible for benefits from 
that date according to the State Industrial Commission guidelines 
and at the direction of state officials, Petitioner applied for 
unemployment benefits on April 3, 1991. Benefits were finally paid 
commencing May 4, 1991, and payment continued through August 31, 
1991. On September 1, 19 91 he accepted employment with 
Mountainwest (Cox) and continued working for that employer until 
January 19 9 2 Mountainwest employer refused to pay him his earned 
commissions• When Petitioner demanded payment Mountainwest, by Mr. 
Cox threatened Petitioner verbally and in writing; (Petitioner's 
Brief Addendum 2); called the Department of Employment Security in 
early March 1992, "and turned in Petitioner." When Petitioner's 
attorney asked Mr. Cox at the initial hearing June 22, 19 9 2 whether 
in fact he owed the Petitioner money, had refused to pay, took out 
bankruptcy to avoid payment and then turned Petitioner in to Job 
Service Mr. Cox answered in the affirmative (Transcript not 
available)«, 
Under the regulations, when a complaining witness has a 
pertinent interest in his complaint, his testimony is not to be 
given weight. Yet, he was the primary witness for the respondent. 
Cox filed for bankruptcy in March 1992 scheduling the 
Petitioner as an ordinary unsecured creditor, and appeared in 
Court. This made the complaining witness the only priority 
claimant in the bankruptcy as the sole employee of Mountainwest. 
After his investigation, Mr. Warner alleged fraud and demanded 
payment from Petitioner of double the benefit. Petitioner 
requested a hearing. In that hearing, conducted by 
Investigator/Hearing Officer Warner, he affirmed that Petitioner 
had indeed defrauded the Respondent. Upon appeal, November 3, 
1992, ALJ Hynek upheld Officer Warner, and the Board upheld the 
ALJ. The Respondent failed to carry the burden of proof 
requirements sufficient to prove that Petitioner had been employed, 
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in what capacity, and for what period of time. The evidence relied 
upon was the testimony of the complaining employer, the "employment 
contract," excerpts from the testimony of the hearing officer and 
agency representative, citing only the claim cards as evidence of 
fraud, wherein Petitioner had failed to report his work or earnings 
for the period in question. Significantly in the later hearing, 
the ALJ added to that earlier ruling and found that "even if he had 
not worked, he could have worked." 
Respondent claims there was no evidence that the claim against 
Petitioner's previous employer was material to the case at hand. 
Petitioner in attempting to provide such written evidence attempted 
to obtain the notes and formal disposition from that trial; 
however, was informed the judge had retired and only an abstract 
was available. The abstract was provided with the Petitioner's 
Brief. Two points are material: 
(a) The employer had failed and refused to pay and the Court 
determined that notwithstanding that tax withholding, 
contributions to the State Unemployment Fund for payments for the 
wages paid, that a "partnership" existed and that Petitioner was 
not an employee and his back wages were forfeit; a finding which 
was upheld on appeal. When this information was provided to Job 
Service, it was their determination that Petitioner was an employee 
and was eligible for unemployment benefits (though it appears on 
this latest review of the documents that he was actually shorted 
benefits which should have been paid from March 20, not April 
29th). What is significant to the case at bar is that the 
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outstanding bids were the property of the Petitioner and these 
accounts were assigned to Cox against which Cox eventually loaned 
money to Petitioner. 
(b) At the second Circuit Court (appeal) hearing, Mr. Cox 
appeared as a witness for the defendant (Petitioner's Brief, 
Addendum 1) which is certainly evidence there was an apparent 
conspiracy between two disgruntled individuals who had both 
determined a way to cheat Petitioner out of his earnings. 
Respondent states the bankruptcy proceedings were for unpaid 
commissions which were not material to the instant case. The 
materiality is obvious, to wit: 
a) Cox suggested and agreed and did, in fact, loan Petitioner 
money as inducement to acquire the outstanding bids from 
Petitioner's clients; the financial transactions between the 
parties are consistent with the transactions and a far more 
reasonable explanation than the findings of the Respondent both for 
the time period of the instant case (R. 160), and the subsequent 
period through January, 1992. 
b) Mr. Cox under oath testified to the Bankruptcy Court that 
the petitioner was not an employee, merely an unsecured creditor. 
c) Mr. Cox did not report the Petitioner as an employee on 
his quarterly unemployment forms. 
d) Mr. Cox did not provide the Petitioner with either a W-2 
form, a 109 9 form, or in any manner acknowledge that there were any 
payments (earnings) reportable to any agency, including Internal 
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Revenue Service, made to petitioner for all of 1991. 
e) That Respondent questions the materiality stating that the 
compensation was earned subsequent to the period at issue is 
absurd. Respondent totally ignores that compensation allegedly 
paid during the period in question was actually earned prior to 
Petitioner's association with the complaining witness; Respondent 
can't have it both ways. 
The Respondent's failure to establish the facts and their 
erroneous decisions thereon are unequivocally errors requiring 
review by this Court. 
POINT I. 
THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE THAT CLAIMANT HAD WORK AND 
EARNINGS BEGINNING APRIL 29, 1991 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1991 
Respondent alleges that Petitioner worked for the time period 
noted supported by substantial evidence including Petitioner's 
testimony. The contract which was dated April 29, 1991 was a 
document by which Petitioner who had been cheated by the previous 
employer hoped to establish credibility for Cox d.b.a. 
Mountainwest. It was for a short period of time (two months), to 
provide compensation when, as, and if his outstanding bids were 
reduced to contract, and to check out the viability of the bids and 
establish performance or pay requirements. It never became an 
operational agreement between the parties. 
Respondent argues the contract allows for up to a year and a 
half to get the accounts in order before Petitioner can get paid, 
yet avers that the contract was drafted to provide for advances. 
Cox paid no advances or draws or commissions however, 
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characterized, until June 7, 1991. Petitioner is quoted as 
allowing up a year and a half to effect payment on a bid, yet 
Respondent suggests that it took only five weeks to earn his first 
commission. No evidence in the record establishes June 7, 1991 
payment as a commission. Respondent refers to Petitioner's 
testimony (R. 118, paragraphs 10 and 11 and R. 120-121) as evidence 
that he was working on sales during this period of time. This 
testimony is that Petitioner was checking occasionally on the 
status of outstanding bids he had "brought to the table" with his 
own clients, not Mountainwest's nor new clients initiated while 
associated with Mountainwest. Petitioner was calling his own 
clients at intervals checking on contracts. "I was in contact with 
a few of the bigger companies in town looking for employment. . 
.something stable." Petitioner was indeed looking for work 
throughout the period of time he collected unemployment benefits. 
The fact that Petitioner continued to diligently search for 
employment has never been contested by Respondent. 
Respondent seeks to justify the dearth of facts to support 
findings that even if Petitioner didn't work for the alleged 
employer, he could have and if he didn't when he could have, he 
would have been ineligible for benefits anyway. The complaining 
witness's self-serving testimony is here evident in terms of 
Respondent's conclusions. If Witness Cox can establish by 
testimony in Bankruptcy Court that Petitioner was not an employee 
Cox's position as an employee takes priority over a general 
unsecured creditor and Cox's "salary" comes ahead of payments from 
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Petitioner's residual. If he can at the same time convince the 
Respondent that Petitioner was an employee who fraudulently 
obtained benefits as an employee, he is not debited with the 
benefits which would have been due Petitioner. Respondent is in 
the case at bar allowing the complaining witness to perpetrate a 
fraud on the lower courts, and arguing that somehow Petitioner is 
the perpetrator rather than the victim. Thus we have Cox's word 
against the Petitioner's word. The Petitioner states Cox did not 
offer him a job, Cox says he did. Under the rules of conflicting 
evidence, the whole record test must be applied which requires that 
the findings must be supported by substantial evidence, Utah Code 
Annotated, Sections 63-46(b)(17). Respondent was charged to review 
all of the evidence, yet failed to discern the truth. 
Under Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-30, it is noted a 
full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings and 
transcription, when requested, shall be provided. Sections 35-4-
10(e) states...all testimony at any hearing upon a disputed matter 
shall be reported but need not be transcribed unless the disputed 
matter is appealed. No transcript has been provided for the first, 
and as it has developed, the decisive hearing, the results of which 
all subsequent reviewers upheld. The whole record not having been 
made available, this procedural flaw is fatal. 
As to whether "he could have worked," the law is clear under 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-4-5(c)(1) and (2) and (2)(ii) that 
in determining whether or not work is suitable, one must take into 
consideration prior earnings, the wages for similar work in the 
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locality and whether wages, hours, or other conditions of the work 
offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than 
those prevailing for similar work; to suggest that the Petitioner 
in this case accepted full-time work for no pay, or even commission 
only in this locality for similar work is ludicrous. Petitioner 
was never advised by Respondent that witnesses to substantiate his 
case could have attended all hearings in violation of his rights 
under the law (U.S. Constitution, Amendment V and XIV); with 
witnesses, he could have proven to the department that the 
standards for such work are well established, none of which require 
commission only and that the policy of the department vis a vis 
residual commissions is well established, the real intent and 
purpose of the "employment contract" and his supportive proof in 
his efforts to find employment with a stable employer. 
Respondent's incorporates a legal opinion in the Olof Nelson 
Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525, 243, P.2d 
951 (1952) citing. This case has no bearing on the instant case as 
Petitioner was not on strike, diligently sought employment, did not 
refuse work and obscured no material information on his claim 
cards. 
In Johnson v. Department of Emp. Sec, 782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), the Respondent's application of law to its factual 
findings exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. 
App.1989), under the "whole record test," a court must consider not 
only the evidence supporting the board's factual findings but also 
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the evidence that fairly detracts from the weight of the board's 
evidence. The Respondent has not fulfilled its directed lawful 
responsibilities. As a direct result of the Respondent's 
procedural flaws, reliance on questionable evidence, and failure to 
review the whole record sufficient to show that despite the 
supporting facts and in light of the conflicting or contradictory 
evidence, the findings are and cannot be supported by substantial 
evidence. Petitioner's rights were unquestionably violated under 
the equal protection clause of the XlVth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE THAT CLAIMANT KNOWINGLY AND 
WILLFULLY WITHHELD INFORMATION REGARDING WORK AND 
EARNINGS TO RECEIVE BENEFITS TO WHICH HE WAS NOT 
ENTITLED. 
Petitioner applied for work at Mountainwest which he fully 
disclosed to Respondent (R. 3) noting the date as April 3, 1991, 
Contact," Mark", How contacted: "in person," result: "?" Mr. Cox 
did not offer Petitioner a job, however, on his testimony upon 
which Respondent relied, he repeatedly states he employed 
Petitioner on a full-time basis on a commission-only arrangement. 
No credible evidence other than the tainted testimony of the self-
serving and complaining witness was provided. Mr. Cox was 
desperately looking for business, recognized Petitioner's 
reputation and clientele, and was very interested in obtaining 
Petitioner's clients. Petitioner assigned certain contracts to Cox 
and Cox would pay a commission on the goods or services when the 
contracts were funded. The written agreement for a two month 
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period was not a contract for employment. Cox's testimony in 
Bankruptcy Court and his evasiveness in testimony in Respondent's 
recorded hearing when pressed for dates and times established this. 
Witnesses could have been called to provide evidence to support the 
truth (see discussion Page 11, Paragraph 1 of this Reply Brief). 
Petitioner determined that he would contact on his own time 
his own clients, refer one or two to Cox and observe Cox's ability 
to perform, again affirming the short term agreement, alleged as a 
two month employment agreement by Respondent and Cox's willingness 
and ability to pay Petitioner. 
The Respondent interpreted that the sales were closed while 
Petitioner was working for Mountainwest and not while he was 
working for the other employers, stating "if the sales had been 
closed while working for the others employers, the commissions 
would have been due from those employers." The Petitioner concurs; 
however, the former employer did not pay so Petitioner negotiated 
a deal initiated by Cox to loan funds against those commissions to 
allow Petitioner the "expenses" of clarifying and securing the bids 
then outstanding. Cox loaned Petitioner approximately $2900 
pursuant to this agreement. Petitioner's residual clients (R.158) 
contacted include, but were not limited to: Bountiful Manor, 
Freebairn, Park City Racquet Club, Smoot, Springwood, Hermies, 
Construction Advisors, Devco, Park City Corp., and Kelly Pipe. 
Letters from three of these clients were provided in the 
Petitioner's Brief, Addenda 5, 6 and 7, establishing that the 
initial sale was made (15 February 1991, and early 1991, 
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respectively) prior to the dates of Petitioner's claim for 
benefits. 
No reliable evidence is in the record or findings as to the 
nature of the obligations giving rise to the payments or their 
purpose except for the testimony and Affidavit of Petitioner. 
Respondent's attempt to correlate the dates and payments were not 
supported or supportable by the evidence. Petitioner testified 
that the loans were draws, however characterized, and were against 
residual accounts of commission earned by Petitioner prior to his 
association with Cox. No evidence by Respondent sets forth any 
reasonable conclusions to the contrary. 
All of the facts were outlined in Petitioner's Affidavit (R. 
140-147) which was ignored by the Board of Review. 
Respondent quotes material from the Job Service guide relating 
to work and earnings; petitioner reaffirms he did not work and had 
no earnings, therefore he did not report any. He did not knowingly 
withhold any information. 
Hypothetically, even if the payments to Petitioner could have 
possibly been characterized as earned income, there were clearly no 
earnings for April or May and no draws (and no time spent), with 
the first services provided by Cox to Petitioner's clients in June 
which would not have been due or paid until at least July and would 
not have been earned under the terms of the alleged contract until 
the invoices were paid which would have been August or September on 
the June services; September/October on July's services, and 
October/November on August's services. Petitioner's attorney 
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pointed out that even if one accepted Respondent's position, 
Petitioner still had no earnings for April, May or June, and then 
was paid for 10 out of 15 weeks; he then provided a model for an 
alternative review of benefits juxtaposed to earnings under the 
rules, all of which was ignored by ALJ Hynek, and the Board. 
Respondent repeatedly acknowledges that it had the burden of 
proof noting there must be a willful misrepresentation or 
concealment of information for the purpose of obtaining benefits, 
then further stating that there was an absence of an admission or 
direct proof of intent to defraud. The Board acknowledged that 
Petitioner had complied with all the rules, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-4-4-(a), had indeed applied for work at various places, 
Section 35-4-4(b), was available for work during each and every 
week in which he made a claim for benefits, Section 35-4-4(c), then 
apparently based their findings wholly on the testimony of the 
complaining witness. Yet, the conclusions were completely 
inconsistent with their findings. 
POINT III. 
PETITIONER SET FORTH RESPONDENT'S ERRORS IN FINDINGS OF 
FACT, LAW, EVIDENCE AND JUDGMENT WHEREIN RESPONDENT 
RELIED ON A PREJUDICED WITNESS, ABUSED JUDICIAL POWERS, 
AND IGNORED COLLATERAL ACTIONS OF OTHER COURTS. 
The Constitution of the United States and of the State of Utah 
note all men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their liberties, protest wrongs and petition for redress of 
grievances, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. Utah Code 
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Annotated, Sections 35-4-10(c) charge . . . each decision of an 
administrative law judge shall represent his independent judgment. 
Sections 35-4-10(e) state the manner in which disputed matters are 
presented...consolidation would not be prejudicial to any party. 
Under these laws, Respondent denied Petitioner his rights. 
Respondent states that the claims set forth in Petitioner's 
Brief under Points III, IV and V are without merit in that there is 
no evidence of a perjured witness. The facts are that Petitioner 
provided ample evidence to support that fact. The documentation 
from the Bankruptcy Court wherein Cox stated under oath that 
Petitioner was not an employee, commissioned or otherwise in direct 
contravention to his testimony in the Respondent's hearing(s), that 
Petitioner was an unsecured creditor; the fact that witness Cox did 
not provide any legally-required proof of labor (W-2, 1099, etc.), 
the letter of threat incorporated into Petitioner's Brief (Addendum 
2); the fact that the witness reported the Petitioner to Job 
Service, and provided whatever written documentation was requested 
by Job Service after Petitioner's termination; the fact that the 
witness was asked in Hearing Officer Warner's hearing whether he 
owed Petitioner money and refused to pay, took out bankruptcy and 
then turned petitioner in to Job Service to which he answered 
"yes;" the fact there was controversial testimony wherein witness 
Cox couldn't recall when Petitioner worked, or how many hours were 
involved, admitted he really didn't know what the contract said as 
to time to be worked or commission paid. The only reliable 
testimony was from Petitioner who stated he had not put in more 
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than ten hours from May 1 to June 7 and that on his own time from 
his home on his own residual accounts. Cox testified that three or 
four months after the initiation of the contract he decided to pay 
a draw which would have been at the earliest in August. 
Notwithstanding, the ALJ decided that witness Cox was the more 
believable party although his conclusions were, at best, 
inferential and speculative and not supported by a reasonable 
burden of proof. 
The board stated in its findings (R. 171) that "based on the 
testimony of the claimant's employer" they affirmed the decision of 
the ALJ. 
The "ample evidence" without the benefit of testimony of Cox 
or Warner noted by Respondent is singularly absent, the findings of 
fact being amply supported by the exhibits of record and by 
Petitioner's testimony is on its face incorrect. The exhibits were 
meaningless without the Cox testimony and in fact supported 
Petitioner's testimony. 
a. No transcript from Hearing Officer Warner's hearing nor 
have his notes have been provided. His decision was based upon his 
opinion which was obviously based upon his own investigation and 
subsequently from untranscribed and therefore unknown testimony of 
the related parties. Under the law, Utah Code Annotated, Sections 
35-1-30 describe that a full and complete record shall be kept of 
all proceedings and transcription, when requested, shall be 
provided. Sections 35-4-10(e) state...all testimony at any hearing 
upon a disputed matter shall be reported but need not be 
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transcribed unless the disputed matter is appealed. Under Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 10 (e)(2) a transcription is 
required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or 
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of 
all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Petitioner 
requested the transcript (R. 177); however, none has been supplied, 
therefore, it is concluded that no evidence exists for Hearing 
Officer Warner's hearing, and as a consequence since the evidence 
does not exist it cannot be included, relied upon, or refuted. 
This is the only evidence upon which the subsequent hearings were 
predicated. 
b. The evidence from ALJ Hynek's hearing has been well 
covered and documented in Petitioner's brief and the numerous 
errors in his assumptions, conclusions and misconduct have been 
pointed out; in describing the elements of fraud, Utah Code 
Annotated, Sections 35-4-6-(d) which are fault, materiality, 
control, and knowledge, ALJ Hynek's opinion was entirely based on 
Hearing Officer Warner's findings and report and testimony (see "a" 
above) and on Witness Cox's testimony. Rule R562.5e-1 mandates a 
willful misrepresentation or concealment of information. 
Willfulness/intentional misrepresentation were never alleged or 
testified to and therefore were never established. Under R562-5e-
3, the burden of proof is on the Respondent; it failed to prove its 
case. Under standards of proof, a preponderance of evidence must 
15 
be relied upon in the absence of an admission; this evidence was 
based upon the inimitable and incorrectly interpreted "contract," 
its interpretation by Cox and the Respondent, and upon the 
testimony of Cox. Neither Petitioner's attorney nor the hearing 
officer nor the ALJ understood the facts and their conclusions were 
based on faulty unreasonable assumptions and conjecture, not 
evidence. The Petitioner freely admitted he did not believe the 
money he received was earnings for employment; he never had an 
opportunity to fully explain why until he prepared his Affidavit 
which was ignored in the review process. 
c. The Board of Review rubberstamped the ALJ's opinion 
"supported by competent evidence;" the evidence upon which they 
relied was from the hearing officer (see a), and Witness Cox; in 
fact, the findings quote only Witness Cox. It then summarily 
dismissed other evidence provided by petitioner on residual 
commissions and stated the perpetual "if earned while working for 
previous employer, commissions would have been due from previous 
employer." This conclusion is at variance with policy of the 
department which does and has held that residual commissions are 
due when earned not when paid. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-4-10(c) charge ...each 
decision of an administrative law judge shall represent his 
independent judgment. Sections 35-4-10(e) state the manner in 
which disputed matters are presented. The Judicial Code charges 
the agency's administrative reviewers with the same 
responsibilities as more formal judges. The agency reviewers 
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ignored the collateral cases on the one hand in Circuit Court and 
on the other in United States Bankruptcy Court wherein the 
Petitioner was listed by the Respondent's complaining witness as an 
unsecured creditor, not an employee of any type. 
Respondent states that Petitioner's charges that Hearing 
Officer Warner's misconduct are without merit. Utah Code Annotated, 
Sections 78-7-1(c) note that "except by consent of all parties, no 
justice, judge, or justice court judge may sit or act in any action 
or proceeding . . . (Petitioner certainly did not give its consent, 
indeed objected at the hearing) when he has been attorney or 
counsel for either party in the action or proceeding." Mr. Warner 
was the departmental investigator and the judge in fact (whether 
allegedly functioning as a departmental representative and not as 
an independent hearings officer or not) on the first round, a 
witness, a departmental representative (objected to by petitioner's 
counsel and overruled) and an advocate at ALJ Hynek's hearing. 
This action and activity are in contravention of law and would have 
represented a mistrial in anything but a kangaroo court. Warner 
should have been disqualified, his findings stricken. Though he may 
not have been the decision-maker in ALJ Hynek's hearing, he 
certainly was an advocate for the department who crossexamined 
witnesses and was a party to the off record discussions. The 
interlineation on his own testimony as a witness has been well-
documented in Petitioner's Brief. 
Respondent states the collateral course cases had no bearing 
on the current case. In truth and in fact, under the law, the 
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collateral findings of other courts are an integral part of the 
case before the Court. 
a. The complaining witness, assessed by the Respondent as the 
employer, failed to designate the Petitioner as an employee, 
however, characterized, in the Bankruptcy Court, stating under 
oath, Petitioner was an unsecured creditor and discharging his debt 
to him thereby. 
b. The previous employer who had refused to pay Petitioner's 
wages was brought to court in a collateral action; this action 
resulted in the finding that petitioner was not an employee; the 
effort in labor by Petitioner to acquire the clients under this 
employment was never paid and was the product of labor designated 
as residual accounts/commissions which Petitioner owned and for 
which he was induced to accept loans by Cox in order that Cox could 
acquire the future business needs and potential income from those 
clients. 
The effect of the Respondent's comment that the cases are not 
material to the case at hand is to deny the presumed obligation of 
a judge to reasonably honor and acknowledge findings by other 
tribunals or courts of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should conclude that Petitioner's issues 
for review are meritorious, that Respondent relied upon a witness 
whose contemporaneous collateral actions impeached his testimony to 
the extent that it should be stricken and totally disregarded. 
Absent the tainted and inconsistent testimony of the complaining 
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witness, the only evidence is Petitioner's which is consistent with 
exhibits entered by Respondent and affirmatively establish his 
entitlement to benefits. The hearing officer who first 
"investigated" the case became the initial trier of fact, 
simultaneously the advocate and witness on an appeal from his own 
findings, from which no transcript exists. This affront to 
judicial propriety should shock the conscience of mankind. 
Petitioner therefore respectfully requests this Court overturn 
the Respondent's findings and order. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of August, 1993. 
Gary yi. Edwards 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Pro se 
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APPENDIX A 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah 
Utah State Constitution 
Article VI, Section 1, 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and 
protect property;...protest against wrongs, and petition for 
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Article I, Section 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12. 
...the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in 
his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf...The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself... 
Utah Code Annotated: 
35-1-30. 
A full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings 
before the commission on any investigation. Testimony shall 
be recorded and may be transcribed when required by the 
commission for further analysis, investigation, hearing, or 
court proceedings. Transcription requested by any party to 
the proceeding shall be provided at the requesting party's 
expense. 
35-4-2 
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this act, 
the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: 
Economic insecurity due to unemployment...Unemploymnet is 
therefor a subject of general interest and concern...to 
prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so 
often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and 
his family...maintaining purchasing power and limiting the 
serious social consequences of unemployment. 
35-4-4(a) 
He has made a claim for benefits with respect to that week in 
accordance with any rules... 
35-4-4(b) 
He has registered for work at, and thereafter continued to 
report at, an employment office... 
35-4-4fc) 
He is able to work and is available for work during each and 
every week with respect to which he made a claim for benefits 
under this chapter, and acted in good faith in an active 
effort to secure employment... 
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35-4-5(e) 
Ineligibility of benefits.. .For each week with respect to 
which the claimant willfully made a false statement or 
representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact 
to obtain any benefit under the provision of this chapter, and 
an additional 13 weeks for the first week the statement or 
representation was made or fact withheld 
Determinations under this subsection shall be made only upon 
a sworn written admission of the claimant or after due notice 
and recorded hearing... 
35-4-6(d) 
Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum 
as benefits to which he was not entitled shall be liable to 
repay the sum...or shall, in the discretion of the commission, 
be liable to have the sum deducted from any future benefits 
payable to him... 
35-4-10(c) 
...Each decision of an administrative law judge shall 
represent his independent judgment. 
35-4-10(e) 
The manner in which disputed matters are 
presented...consolidation would not be prejudicial to any 
party...All testimony at any hearing upon a disputed matter 
shall be reported but need not be transcribed unless the 
disputed matter is appealed. 
35-4-17(b)(l) 
Each employer shall furnish the commission such information as 
is necessary for the proper administration and shall include 
wage information for each employee. .. 
35-4-22(5) (A) 
Whether the individual works his or her own schedule or is 
required to comply with another person's instructions about 
when, where, and how work is to be performed; 
35-4-22(5)(G) 
Whether the individual establishes his or her own time 
schedule or does the employer set the time schedule. 
35-4-22(5)(L) 
Whether the individual is paid by the job or on a straight 
commission or is paid by the employer in regular amounts at 
stated intervals. 
35-4-22(6)(S) 
Unless services would constitute employment at common law, 
"employment" does not include services as an outside salesman 
paid solely by way of commission, if the services were 
performed outside of all places of business of the enterprises 
for which the services are performed. 
35-4-22(7) 
"Included and excluded service" means ...if all services 
performed during more than one-half of any such pay period by 
an individual for the person employing him do not constitute 
employment then none of the services of the individual for the 
period are considered to be employment. 
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